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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * *

THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION,
a Texas corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant
and Crossclaim Respondent,
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
vs
Case No . 860413

GAIL C. POTTER and LORI
POTTER, his wife,
Defendants - Respondents
and Cross Appellants.
* * * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Respondents submit that the issues presented on appeal are
those three issues set forth in Appellant's Brief, and the
additional issue presented on the Cross Appeal as to the
entitlement of Respondents
1.

to damages .

Did the trial court err in refusing to award damages t

Gail and Lori Potter for the Appellant's continuing trespass an
use of the Respondents' property?

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents, Gail and Lori Potter, purchased 5.92 acres of
property in West Jordan to build a shopping center (R. pp 214215).

A portion of that property is a piece approximately 87

feet by 129 feet on the corner of 6200 South and 3655 West in
Salt Lake County (R. p 2 1 5 ) .

Respondents received a Warranty

Deed to the property in June, 1984 (Ex. 12) and a policy of tit
insurance (R. p 2 1 8 ) .

The property was purchased from a

corporation called Big Six, and the Respondents utilized a real
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

estate agent named Eva Nielsen (R. p 220) in consummating the
transaction.

The actual closing was handled for the Respondents

by their daughter, Jana Fuca (R. p 2 3 8 ) .
Next to the property purchased by the Respondents is a 7Eleven store owned by Southland Corporation.
its responsive pleadings

Southland admits in

that M r . and M r s . Potter own the corner

property next to the store (R. p 49, IT 1; R. pp

126-127).

The lot owned by the Appellant is 102 feet wide by 160 feet
long as shown in the Addendum to Appellant's Brief at Page A - 2 .
The long side of their lot lies contiguous to 6200 South
affording Appellants 160 feet of access on a Salt Lake County
road .
When the Respondents purchased
1984,

their property in June of

they made inquiry of a title company to search the title

(R. p 214) and the real estate agent to inquire if 7-Eleven had
any other rights of access (R. p 2 1 5 ) .
Specifically, Jana Fuca asked the realtor to check with 7Eleven, which she did (R. p 239; R. p 222-223).
described

The realtor

the Appellant's response as: "They could not find any

record of any entitlement of that property to them."
Appellants purchased

(R. p 2 3 9 ) .

their lot based on a contract

themselves and the prior owner signed July 3, 1975.

between

(Ex. 1 ) .

They amended their contract to change the dimensions and
description of the lot size by a subsequent written contract
dated March 9, 1976 (Ex. 2 ) .

They received a Warranty Deed for

the property described in Exhibit 2, which contains the metes and
bounds description of the lot upon which they built their store.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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None of the contracts or the Deed between Appellant and its
grantor, make any mention of an easement purchase or grant,
rights of ingress and egress, or other rights of access over any
property other than that specifically described

in the

agreements .
M r . E . L. Pack, who was the zone manager for 7-Eleven
to 20 years, handled
159).

for 18

this purchase for the Appellants (R. p

He also was responsible for between 140 to 150 other

acquisitions during his employment (R. p 1 5 9 ) .

He testified in

response to an inquiry of whether 7-Eleven had paid anything for
any interest in the disputed corner parcle that:
"At no time was that ever offered to us for sale or
purchase (R . 181) .
The Secretary/Treasurer of the Corporation which sold
Southland

their lot, M r . Bob Bowles, indicated that it was never

the Seller's intent to grant 7-Eleven access across the corner
parcel (R. p 2 0 7 ) .

His company, in fact, had intentions of

constructing a service station on this same property (R. p 2 0 6 ) .
The Appellant's brief is replete with summaries about the
rezoning of this property (Appellant's Brief pp 5 - 8 ) .

All of the

reference to Minutes of Planning and Zoning Department were
admitted subject to a continuing objection (R. p 188) that the
Planning Department was an advisory body under § 10-9-4 U.C.A.
(1953, amended) and the zoning power lay only with the City
Council pursuant to § 10-9-1 U.C.A. (1953, amended) and that
these miscellaneous discussions were otherwise irrelevant to the
construction and enforcement of the documents conveying title.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Nevertheless, the Appellants, themselves, presented

into

evidence Exhibit 7 which is a copy of the City Council of West
Jordan's meeting regarding the zoning of the parcel in
question.

This meeting took place on December 9, 1975 which was

after the initial contract between 7-Eleven and Big Six had been
signed, but three and one-half months prior to the amendment (Ex.
2

)•
Exhibit 7 clearly establishes that on December 9, 1975 the

entire parcel of property now owned by 7-Eleven and the Potters
(6.39 acres) was rezoned CN (commercial) without condition or
exception (see attached

minutes).

Three months after the City Council meeting, Southland
amended the sale contract to change the size of the lot (Ex. 2)
and that agreement went on to say, in part:

"In all other

respects, said purchase agreement is hereby ratified and
reaffirmed
There is also one sentence upon which Appellants rely which
is found in Exhibit 3

> thirj.

of-ways in from Dixie Drive"

"We will also want two right-

(R. p 1 7 5 ) .

This document was

found not to be meaningful by the trial court for the reasons
described

below.

Exhibit 3 was written on stationary of West Jordan City and
dated April 11, 1976.
the City.

It is not signed by anyone

representing

It is not acknowledged nor is there any claim that it

was ever recorded.

The City Planner, who was employed by West

Jordan at the time, testified

that he did not even know where the

original document was located (R. p 194) but it was not in his
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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files

(R. p 194) and

Jordan

because

no dispute
Potter

he had

not

that w h a t e v e r

never

There

saw

are

conveyance

it

of

property which

but

it

the property which
amendment
During
in J u n e ,

continually
utilizing
in fact

to

the

their

7-Eleven

of West

There

is

for, M r .

demonstrating

from Big

acres.

agreed

12 is a
Exhibit

to purchase

2 is simply

the size

of

the

Six

Exhibit

5.92

Exhibit

1

the

an

the piece

of

purchase.
7-Eleven

contracted

received

and

was

agreed

not

that

to buy pursuant

for

in A p r i l ,

purchase

1986,

the

of

admitted

it

describes

to the M a r c h ,

property.

continually

parking,

on

the ground

the owner

property

Southland
selling

(R. p 2 1 7 ) .

They

was

cars

used

and

the

(R. p 2 1 7 ) .
of

the property,

the p r o p e r t y was
per month

damages

for

their

Appellant

on R e s p o n d e n t ' s

permission

$4,000.00
to award

the P o t t e r ' s

trial

lines

M r . Potter,

declined

(Ex. 3) was

the P o t t e r s .

changing

to

from

trespassed

painted

to a high

or

is stipulated

the property

value

(R. p 1 9 5 ) .

in evidence

property.

which

they

time

property without

rental

in the file

(Ex. 2 ) .

the

1984

file

in real property

contract

The W a r r a n t y Deed

1976

documents

whereby

they wish

evidence,

their

Respondents

contract

that

if it was

document

7-Eleven
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amendment

into

that

interest
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is the original

seen
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to either
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of any
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he didn't

for
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The

continuing

trial
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month

court

trespass

103) .

per

fair

(R. p

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant has no interests in the Respondents 1 property.

It

never purchased any rights in the property nor has its use been
of sufficient duration to become adverse to the record owner.
Its claim is too obscure (being without description or duration)
to support its claim.

It has never purchased the interest

alleged nor has any party ever conveyed it to it.
The Appellant admits using the Respondents 1 land for 22
months without right or permission.

Respondents are entitled to

reimbursement for the value of that use.

POINT I .
Gail And Lori Potter Are The Fee Simple
Owners Of The Property In Question And
Appellant Has No Interest In Nor Access Over It
The history of the purchase of the contiguous parcel of
property can be summarized concisely.

On July 3, 1979, 7-Eleven

signed a contract (Ex. 1) to buy a lot from Big Six
Corporation.

That contract was never recorded

(R. p 179) but it

contained a legal description of certain property.
1976, the contract was amended to insert a different
description (Ex. 2 ) .

In March,
legal

That agreement was never recorded but a

Warranty Deed for the property described

therein was recorded in

approximately April, 1976.
Southland Corporation constructed a convenience store on
their property, but they have also been using the adjacent

corner

parcel which is not described in any of the documents and was not
purchased because
wasn't
offered
sale
(R. BYU.
p 181).
Digitized byit
the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. for
Reuben Clark
Law School,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

M r , and M r s . Potter purchased the property next to the 7Eleven store in June, 1984.

They investigated both the recorded

title and inquired about 7-Eleven f s

use of the corner.

There

being no documents, recorded interest, long-term uses or other
asserted rights, they completed the purchase of the property and
received a Warranty Deed and a Title Policy.
There is no dispute that both Deeds (7-Eleven f s and
Potter's) set forth the legal description of the property
described in their respective sale documents.
There is no recorded and/or written document conveying or
reserving any interest in the parcel to Appellant.
submitted

It is

that Appellant is simply attempting to obtain, for

free, that which they never purchased.
Section 57-1-6 U.C.A. (1953, amended) states:
"Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument
in writing setting forth an agreement to convey any rea
estate or whereby any real estate may be affected, to
operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or
acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed by
this title and recorded in the office of the county in
which such real estate is situated . . ."
Futher, § 57-2-1 U.C.A. (1953, amended) states:
Every conveyance in writing whereby any real estate is
conveyed or may be affected shall be acknowledged or
proved and certified in the manner herein provided."
and the Statute of Frauds found at § 25-5-3 U.C.A.

(1953)

mandates that a contract for the sale of real property be
subscribed by the party granting the conveyance.
Also, § 57-3-3 U.C.A. (1953, amended) further

protects

Respondent:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
may contain errors.
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"Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which
shall not be recorded as provided in this Title, shall
be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good
faith and for a valuable consideration of the same
estate, or any portion thereof, where his own conveyance
shall be first duly recorded."
There is simply no document, promise, or contract which
gives 7-Eleven the rights they assert over the Respondents'
property.

In fact, their own agent, M r . Pack, testified that he

knew the property wasn't for sale (R. p 1 8 1 ) .
In addition to the lack of any written or oral agreement or
contract for the corner property and the complete absence of any
conveyance of any interest thereto, there was no consideration.
Where there is no consideration given, a document (if there was
one) is in and of itself invalid to convey any interest in real
property.

Gold Oil Land Development Corporation v. Davis, Utah,

611 P.2d 711 (1980).

If Appellant actually contends that the

Exhibit 3 document could convey an interest in real property, it
is not a valid contract nor enforceable.
In Davidson v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2nd, 338, 517 P.2d

1026

(1973) this Court had an opportunity to review a contract
allowing buyers to approve the net acreage description at a
future time.

The Court held:

"This writing constituted a mere expression of a purpose
to make a contract in the future, for the whole matter
was contingent on further negotiations . The trial court
erred in its conclusion that the writing constituted a
valid, enforceable contract."
If one could, by any stretch of the imagination, see Exhibit
3 as a contract, it is certainly only an expression to make a
future contract.

Also, Exhibit 3 contains no property

description whatsoever nor any terms of sale.

It is overly vague

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
-OCR,
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and unenforceable •
P .2d 491 (1967).

Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2nd 368, 423

The trial court determined

this document to be

meaningless.

POINT II .
There Is No Implied Easement Across
M r . And M r s . Potter's Property
It appears that Appellants are attempting to impress upon
the property which was purchased by the Potters, an easement
which they could not buy nor acquire by useage .

They contend

that there is an implied easement and cite general language from
the Restatement of Property concerning the philosophy behind

such

easements that are also known as "ways of necessity".
The authority cited by the Appellant in Savage v. Nielsen,
114 Utah 22, 197 P .2d 117 (1948) concisely states that the
purpose and philosophy behind the "way of necessity" is to
prevent people from dividing property into many parcels and
selling those parcels without providing reasonable access.
Savage, supra the Court recognized

In

that reasonable access or

right-of-way must be provided to a party where:
"The physical location of the other tract is such that
it is not reasonably accessible without crossing the
tract conveyed away." (at pg. 121)
It is not the case, however, that Appellant purchased or acquired
any property rights in the adjoining property in this instance.
It is also not the case that they lack access to their
property.

They abut a county road the entire length of their

property and have 160 ? of public access.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Appellant's authority does not support a "way of
necessity".

Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d

264

(1947) is an action in which the Court, at Page 270, specificall
stated that it was not a case where innocent parties had been
mislead by the public records.

This was a suit that determined

various rights created between all the parties who knew or shoul
have known that there were rights in existence at the time of
sale but which were not reflected by the public records.

In tha

case, an obvious irrigation ditch which had been used to provide
water to one of the parcels of properties for over 30 years was
destroyed and there was no alternative available.

It is simply

inapposite to the facts in this action.
Appellant's reliance on the Restatement of Property (1T476 p
2977) deletes crucial factors which are set forth to be
considered by the Court in determining the existence of a "way o
necessity."

Those factors are:

(a)

Whether claimant is the conveyor or conveyee

(b)

The terms of conveyance

(c)

The consideration given

(d)

Whether the claim was made against a simultaneous

(e)

The extent of necessity;

(f)

Whether reciprocal benefits result to conveyor and

(g)

The manner in which the land was used prior to its

conveyee;
' * •

convyee;

conveyance;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(h)

The extent to which the prior use was or might have

been known to the parties.
In summary there is simply no basis to conceive of a "way of
necessity" across a contiguous property since it is not necessary
for access or use of the Appellant's property; did not exist
prior to their purchase, there was no consideration given for it,
they have never asserted it until now; and, the trial court
established

that the evidence simply did not support such a

contention.

POINT III.
The Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law and
Judgment In This Case Accurately Set Forth
The Findings Of The Court
Respondent is confused as to what deficiency Appellant
contends exists in the Findings of Fact, especially in light of
the fact that no objection was ever raised at the trial court
level as to any supposed inadequacy, nor was any request made to
amend or supplement those Findings.
The Appellant's Amended Complaint sets forth their entire
causes of action as to any property interests in M r , Potter's
land in Paragraph 4 (R. p 3 9 ) .

The rest of the Amended

Complaint is addressed to the legal description of the property
and the Appellant's need for a Restraining Order or Injunction.
That paragraph states:
"Plaintiff has and claims an easement and right of
ingress and egress over and across the property owned by
Defendants Potters for its customers and other
invitees. Said easement and right of ingress and egress
arise both by express agreement with the predecessor in
interest of Defendants Potters and by implication. It
has been used as such for a period in excess of 9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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years. Such agreement runs with the land and binds
Defendants Potters who have both actual and constructive
notice of Plaintiff's rights in said property and its
rights to use the same for ingress and egress to its 7Eleven s tore . "
Upon completion of the trial the trial court, in regards to
the allegation set forth in Paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint
made the following Findings of Fact (R. p 9 9 ) :
" 4 . Plaintiff's claim of an easement across property
purchased by the Defendant is without basis in that the
Plaintiff acquired no property rights to cross this
property, there is no recorded document conveying any
easement or property rights to the Plaintiff to use or
cross the Defendants' property and the parties have
admitted that there was no written conveyance or
recordable instrument conveying any property rights to
the contiguous property purchased by the Defendants.
Further, no consideration was exchanged for any property
interest in the property owned by the Defendants."
It is submitted

to this Court that complete, adequate

Findings in accordance with the laws of this State have been
entered and Appellant is simply grasping at straws in an attempt
to find something upon which to base their appeal.
Rucker v. Dalton, Utah, 598 P.2d

1336 (1979), cited by

Appellants states at page 1338;
"To that end the findings should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached."
In this instance there were two claims:
necessity" and (2)

an agreement.

(1)

The trial court

a "way of
specifically

found that neither claim had any merit and the findings

establish

the basis in a clear and distinct manner.

POINT IV .
Respondents Should Be Entitled To An Award
Of Damages For The Continuing Trespass By The Appellants
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
The evidence is uncontradicted
thaterrors.
Appellants and their

customers have been utilizing the Respondents' property
continually since its purchase in 1984 (R. p 1 1 9 ) .
totally unauthorized

(R. p 2 1 7 ) .

That use was

The fair rental value of the

property being used was between $2,000 and $4,000 per month.
Utilizing the lowest figure admitted into evidence would result
in the minimum damage of $2,000 x 22 months (June 1984 to April,
1986) of $44,000 .
The Respondent's testimony was admissable to support his
damages, especially since Appellant put on no evidence
contradicting

this evidence.

Williams v. Oldroyd, Utah, 581 P .2d

561 (1978) .
Also, since the record is undisputed

that Appellant's agent,

M r . Pack, knew from the beginning that they never acquired

this

property (R. pp 180-181) the flagrant and willful trespass
required the award of punitive damages.

Powers v. Taylor, 14

Utah 2d 152, 379 P .2d 380 (1963)

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed except as
to the issue of damages which the Respondents are entitled.

The

Appellants, a huge company with extensive real estate interests,
are trying to grab property which they never owned, for nothing,
from an innocent third party.

The attempt itself is

reprehens ible.
This matter should be remanded with instructions to enter
judgment for damages in favor of Respondents for at least

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$44,000, being the minimum value of the property Appellant has
simply elected to use without any claim or permission.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this

/

day of December, 1986.

Ms-£2
Robert Felton
MAILING

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of
the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by United States

first-class

mail, postage prepaid, to Ralph L. Jerman and B .L . Dart 1407 West
North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah and on the

<K
-^

December, 1986 .

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

day of

ADDENDUM TO TRIAL BRIEF

UTAH STATUTES CITED

NO. 1

GAIL POTTER TESTIMONY

NO. 2

JANA FUCA TESTIMONY

NO . 3

E . L . PACK TESTIMONY

NO . 4

ROBERT BOWLES TESTIMONY

NO . 5

MINUTES OF WEST JORDAN CITY COUNCIL

NO. 6
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NO . 1

UTAH STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3
Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-3
Utah Code Annotated § 57-2-1
Utah Code Annotated § 57-1-6
Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-1
Utah Code Annotated § 10-9-4
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS
fraud or the violation of a duty imposed
under a fiduciary or confidential relationship.
Hawkins v. Perry (1953) 123 U 16, 253 P 2d
372.
Where defendant altered a certificate of
sale of land by inserting his own name as
purchaser and the land was not included in
the decedent's estate which was distributed
in 1924, there was a constructive trust for the
benefit of the decedent's heirs and the estate
could be reopened. Perry v. McConkie (1953)
1 U 2d 189, 264 P 2d 852.
A deed given to secure a debt, though absolute in form, was in equity a mortgage, so
that a trust was created by operation of law
and, under the express language of this section, was not prevented by 25-5-1. Taylor v.
Turner (1972) 27 U 2d 39, 492 P 2d 1343.
Parol evidence may be introduced to prove
a constructive trust or resulting trust since
they arise by operation of law and are
expressly excluded from the statute of frauds
by this section. In re Estate of Hock (1982)
655 P 2d 1111.

25-5-3

Wills.
When will is sought to be maintained also
as a contract, it must satisfy this and succeeding sections of the statute of frauds.
Ward v. Ward (1938) 96 U 263, 85 P 2d 635.
Collateral References.
Applicability of statute of frauds to contracts to surrender, rescind or abandon
trusts, 106 ALR 1313,173 ALR 281.
Character and validity of instrument as
contract as affected by provision for postmortem payment or performance, 1 ALR 2d
1178.
Decedent's agreement to devise, bequeath,
or leave property as compensation for services, 106 ALR 742.
Enforceability, as regards proceeds of sale
of property, of real estate trust that does not
satisfy statute of frauds, 154 ALR 385.
Grantee's oral promise to grantor as giving
rise to trust, 159 ALR 997.
Trust arising by grantee's oral promise to
grantor, 35 ALR 280, 45 ALR 851, 80 ALR
195,129 ALR 689,159 ALR 997.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Trusts.
Trusts arising by implication or operation
of law are expressly excluded from the effects
of the statute; and a deed of conveyance,

though absolute in form,' if given to secure a
debt, is in equity treated as a mortgage —
a trust by operation of law. Wasatch Min. Co.
v. Jennings (1887) 5 U 243,15 P 65.

25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. Every contract for
the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands,
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note
or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized
in writing.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §2463;
C.L. 1917, § 5813; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-5-3.
Compiler's Notes.
Analogous former statute, 2 Comp. Laws
1888, § 3918(5).
Agent's authority.
In action for specific performance of contract for sale of real property, held in
absence of evidence showing defendant's
agent was authorized in writing to sell real
property or equities taking case out of statute of frauds, trial court properly granted
motion for dismissal of action. Lee v.
Polyhrones (1921) 57 U 401,195 P 201.

If there is no contract there cannot, of
course, arise any question as to a requirement that it should be in writing and subscribed by the party or his agent. Skeen v.
Van Sickle (1932) 80 U 419,15 P 2d 344.
Where real estate agents had no express or
implied authority under listing agreement to
execute contract of sale of real estate on
behalf of vendors, latter were not bound by
the terms of an earnest money agreement.
Frandsen v. Gerstner (1971) 26 U 2d 180, 487
P 2d 697.
There is no requirement that the agent of
the lessee or assignee be authorized in writing to execute the lease or assignment. Zeese
v. Estate of Siegel (1975) 534 P 2d 85.
Introduction of parol evidence was proper
to show that agent who made contract in his
own name was acting for corporate principal,
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57-3-3

REAL ESTATE

— Mortgages.
The matter of priority between successive
mortgages is governed by general principles of
mortgage law. This is true as to purchase
money mortgages. State v. Johnson, 71 Utah
572, 268 P. 561 (1928).

Recordation as notice.
One who deals with real property is charged
with notice of what is shown by the records of
the county recorder of the county in which the
real property is situated. Crompton v. Jenson,
78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931).

— Overlapping conveyances.
Where deeds involved in two separate conveyances contained descriptions of land that
overlapped, party who first recorded notice of
purchase prevailed. Wilson v. Schneiter's Riverside Golf Course, 523 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1974).

"Recorded."
There is nothing in this section or § 57-3-3
which specifically defines what is meant by the
word "recorded." Boyer v. Pahvant Mercantile
& Inv. Co., 76 Utah 1, 287 P. 188 (1930).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and
Recording Laws § 98.
C.J.S. — 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser
§ 324.
A.L.R. — Recorded real property instrument

as charging third party with constructive notice of provisions of extrinsic instrument referred to therein, 89 A.L.R.3d 901.
Key Numbers. — Vendor and Purchaser *»
231(1).

57-3-3. Effect of failure to record.
Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall not be recorded
as provided in this title, shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in
good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any
portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2001;
C.L. 1917, § 4901; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-3-3.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of failure to record.
Priorities.
— Description of property insufficient.
— Prior unrecorded conveyance.
Words and phrases defined.
— "Conveyance."
Mortgage.
— "Recorded."
Effect of failure to record.
Where, after mortgage was executed on certain tract of land, owner executed deed to
grantee on property not included in mortgage,
which deed was not recorded, decree in action
to foreclose mortgage on tract of land, including part conveyed to grantee, was not binding
on grantee who was not party to such action.
Federal Land Bank v. Pace, 87 Utah 156, 48
P.2d 480, 102 A.L.R. 819 (1935).
A judgment lien is subordinate and inferior
to a deed which predated it whether recorded

after such judgment or whether not recorded at
all. Kartchner v. State Tax Comm'n, 4 Utah 2d
382, 294 P.2d 790 (1956).
Where buyers did not record their own conveyance, or contract, they did not obtain the
statutory protection enjoyed by subsequent
purchasers in good faith and for value against
unrecorded interests. Gregerson v. Jensen, 669
P.2d 396 (Utah 1983).
Priorities.
— Description of property insufficient
Although defendant's deed was recorded
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57-2-1

REAL ESTATE

CHAPTER 2
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Section
57-2-1.
57-2-2.
57-2-3.
57-2-4.
57-2-5.
57-2-6.
57-2-7.
57-2-8.
57-2-9.

Manner of acknowledging or proving
conveyances.
Who authorized to take acknowledgments.
Acknowledgment by deputy.
Taking acknowledgments of persons
with United States armed
forces.
Certificate of acknowledgment.
Party must be known or identified.
Form of certificate of acknowledgment.
When grantor unknown to officer.
When executed by attorney in fact.

Section
57-2-10. Proof of execution—How made.
57-2-11. Witness must be known or identified.
57-2-12. Certificate of proof by subscribing
witness.
57-2-13. Form of certificate of proof.
57-2-14. When subscribing witness deadProof of handwriting.
57-2-15. What evidence required for certificate of proof.
57-2-16. Subpoena to subscribing witness.
57-2-17. Disobedience of subpoenaed witness—Contempt—Proof
aliunde.

57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving conveyances.
Every conveyance in writing whereby any real estate is conveyed or may be
affected shall be acknowledged or proved and certified in the manner hereinafter provided.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1984;
C.L. 1917, § 4884; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-2-1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Deed
Either the acknowledgment or the proving
must accompany every deed to make it valid.
Both are not necessary to make it prima facie

good, either being sufficient if the deed is otherwise sufficient. Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 5
Utah 205, 14 P. 338 (1887), afTd, 142 U.S. 241,
12 S.Ct. 158, 35 L. Ed. 999 (1891).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. —1 Am. Jur. 2d Acknowledgments § 5.

C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Acknowledgments §§ 6,7.
Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment«» 3,4.

57-2-2. Who authorized to take acknowledgments.
The proof or acknowledgment of every conveyance whereby any real estate
is conveyed or may be affected shall be taken by some one of the following
officers:
(1) If acknowledged or proved within this state, by a judge or clerk of a
court having a seal, or a notary public, county clerk or county recorder.
(2) If acknowledged or proved without this state and within any state
or territory of the United States, by a judge or clerk of any court of the
United States, or of any state or territory, having a seal, or by a notary
414
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57-1-6

REAL ESTATE

ing to another person or persons an interest in land in which an interest is
retained by the grantor and by declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by use
of such words as herein provided. In all cases the interest ofjoint tenants must
be equal and undivided.
History: R.S. 1898 & CL 1907, § 1973; C.L.
1917, § 4873; R.S 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-5; L.
1953, ch. 93, § 1.

Cross-References. — Inheritance tax on
jointly held property, § 59-12-5.
Interparty agreements, § 15-3-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Joint tenancies.
—Alienation and execution.
—Judicial sales.
—Severance by conveyance or sale.
Preference for tenancy in common.
Joint tenancies.
—Alienation and execution.
The Supreme Court of the United States has
said that it would assume that "Utah accepts
the general common-law rules relating to joint
tenancies, including the rules permitting
alienation of the interest of a joint tenant, and
making its property subject to execution and
separate sale." Mangus v. Miller, 317 U.S. 178,
63 S. Ct. 182, 87 L. Ed., 169, rehearing denied,
317 U.S. 712, 63 S. Ct. 432, 87 L. Ed. 567
'1943'—Judicial sales.
Where a joint tenant defaulted on her obligation to a mortgagee, her subsequent purchase

of the property at a judicial sale was deemed to
covenants. Jolley v.
C o r r v 6 7 1 R 2 d 1 3 9 ( U t a h 1983)
'
_ s e v e r a n c e by conveyance or sale.

b e f o r t h e b e n e f l t o f a11

The rule that a joint te
Qne tenant,g c o n v

ce

is 8evered b
l i e 8 n o t o n l to vol .

,

, . , .
, .
y <™v<>yan«*. but also to involuntary
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ o T / ' l L ,^<. u ^ o ^ 8 ,
'
v Corr
'
y> 6 7 1 R 2 d 1 3 9 ( U t a h 1983 >P r e ference for tenancy in common.
This section expresses the trend away from
the English joint tenancy and in favor of tenancy in common. Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181,
120 P.2d 327 (1941).
untar

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Cotenancy
and Joint Ownership § 27.
C.J.S. — 86 C.J.S. Tenancy in Common § 7.
A.L.R. — Severance or termination of joint

tenancy by conveyance of divided interest directly to self, 7 A.L.R.4th 1268.
Key Numbers. — Tenancy in Common «=» 3.

57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice — Operation
and effect — Interest of person not named in instrument.
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting
forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may
be affected, to operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the
office of the recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, but
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs,
acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have
had actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein
386
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57 1-6

PON

•ovided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in
ich instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise
irports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms
'the trust, shall operate to charge any third person with notice of the interjt of any person or persons not named in such instrument or of the grantor or
rantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as was
wiveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed
y the instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein provided setting
)rth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and decribing the property charged with such interest
County recorder, § 17-21-1 et seq.
Fees of recorder, § 21-2-3.
Judgments, record of as imparting notice,
17-21-11.
Recording generally, § 57-3-1 et seq,
::ismitting documents by telegraph oi
one, § 69-1-2.

History: R.S, 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1975;
!.L 1917, § 4875; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
8-1-6; L. 1945, ch. 106, § 1; 1947, ch. 97, § I,
Cross-References. — Acknowledgments
generally, § 57-2-1 et seq.
Certified copies of record of conveyance, adnisaion in evidence, § 78-25-13.
NO I ES

'hCISIONS

ANALYSIS

4,-Vrrwledgmentp
t notice
* -:i (mments
1
to inquire
-.ution sales
—Occupancy an ; possession,
-Trusts.
Delivery of deed.
Effect of failure to record.
Equitable rights.
Livery of seizin.
Mortgages.
Patents.
Priorities.
Recital of consideration.
Recordation as notice.
—In general.
—Forged deed.
"Recorded" construed.
Acknowled gments.
A deed as between the parties and those having notice thereof is good without any acknowledgment, and actual possession constitutes notice. Jordan v. Utah R RM 47 Utah 519, 156 P.
939 (1916).
A deed need not be acknowledged to be valid
between the parties thereto. Mitchell v.
Palmer, 121 Utah 245, 240 P.2d 970 (1952),
Acknowledgment taken by mortgagee him
self as notary public is void; thus, a mortgage,
acknowledged by the mortgagee, though recorded, is ineffective for purpose of notice, since
it is not legally recordable. Norton v. Fuller, 68
Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926). See § 57-2-1 et seq.

Actual notice.
—Assignments.
Attaching creditors who had actual notice of
assignment for benefit of creditors were not in
position to object that statutory notice of assignment was not given. Snyder v. Murdock,
20 Utah 407, 59 P. 88 (1899),
-—Duty to inquire.
Fhe demands of this section are answered if
a party dealing with the land has information
of a fact or facts that would put a prudent man
upon inquiry and would, if pursued, lead to actual knowledge of the state of the title; this is
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ZONING, BUILDING AND PLANNING
Section
10-9-28. Short title — Definitions.
10-9-29. Severability clause — Jurisdiction of
commission over public property.

10-9-1

Section
10-9-30. Violation of chapter or ordinance
punishable as misdemeanor
Remedies of municipality and
owners of real estate.

ARTICLE 1
ZONING POWER OF CITIES AND TOWNS
10-9-1. Power to regulate and restrict height and size of
buildings and height and location of trees and
other vegetation — Regulations to encourage use
of solar and other forms of energy.
For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals and the general welfare
of the community the legislative body of cities and towns is empowered to
regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and
other structures, the height and location of trees and other vegetation, the
percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open
spaces, the density of population and the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes. Regulations
and restrictions of the heights and number of stories of buildings and other
structures, and the height and location of trees and other vegetation shall not
apply to existing buildings, structures, trees or vegetation except for new
growth on such vegetation. These regulations may also encourage energy-efficient patterns of development, the use of solar and other renewable forms of
energy, and energy conservation and may assure access to sunlight for solar
energy devices.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 1; R.S. 1933,
County zoning and planning, § 17-27-1 et
15-8-89; L. 1941, ch. 18, § 1; C. 1943, 15-8-89; 8eq.
L. 1981, ch. 44, § 1.
Lumberyards and combustible materials,
Amendment Notes. - - The 1981 amend- pron ibition within fire limits, § 10-8-70.
ment inserted the height^and location of trees
panning Enabling Act and
Municipal
and other vegetation in the first sentence, and
- ...
, .
°,
,
added the last two sentences.
f ^ Q
*
thereunder,
Cross-References. — Airport zoning regu- * 10-9-19 et seq.
Slum
lations, § 2-4-1 et seq.
clearance, §§ 11-15-1 et seq., 11-19-1
Building and fire regulations, § 10-8-52.
et seq.
Conformity to zoning ordinances of other poState planning coordinator, § 63-28-1 et seq.
litical subdivisions, § 11-16-1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Deed restrictions and covenants.
Fraternity and sorority houses.
Gasoline filling and service station.
Initiative power of the people.
Judicial review.
Prior nonconforming use.

%
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10-9-4

(T1IKS

Will

ii " U N -

10-9-4. Planning commission
Zoning plan, ordinance,
maps and recommendations — Certification to
legislative body — Zoning of municipality.
In order to more fully avail itself of the pbwers conferred by this chapter to
the mayor, with the advice and consent of the legislative body, may appoint a
commission to be known as the planning commission. The planning commission, through its own initiative may, or by order of the legislative body of the
municipality shall, make and certify to the legislative body a zoning plan,
including both the full text of the zoning ordinance and maps, and representing the planning commission's recommendations for zoning the municipality.
The legislative body may, after receiving the recommendations of the planning commission for the zoning of the municipality, divide the municipality
into districts or zones of such number, shape, and area as it may determine,
and within such districts may regulate the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, and uses of buildings and structures, and the uses of land.
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 4; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 15-8-92; L. 1949, ch 15, § 1; 1983, ch.
33, § 5,
Amend.me.nl Notes. - - IThe 1983 amendmen t substituted "the mayor, with the advice

and consent < >f the legislative body" for "such
legislative body",
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Municipal Planning
Enabling Act and planning commissions thereunder, § 10-9-19 et seq.

NOTKN TO IIKCISIONS

Discretion of city council
Fraternity and sorority houses.
Spot zoning.
D i s c r e t i o n of city council.
The discretion of the governing bociv ui ;i t ••
is very extensive with regard to the wisdom f
the plan, the necessity for the zoning, the number and the nature of the districts to be created, the boundaries thereof and the uses permitted therein. It is the primary duty of the
city to make the classifications. If a classification is reasonably doubtful, the judgment of
the court will not be substituted for the judgment of the city. In short, unless the action of
the governing body of the city is arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, or clearly offends
some provision of the Constitution or another
statute, the court must uphold it, if it is within
the municipality's grant of power. Marshall v.
Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704.
149 A.L.R. 282 (1943).
By the terms of this section, and §§ 10-w i i
10-9-3, the governing body of a city is granted
discretionary power to district and zone cities
for various purposes t h a t are to the public interest; the exercise of that power will not be
interfered with by the courts unless the discretion is abused. Phi Kappa Iota Fraterr»" v "

-alt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177
' 9 V1 i aiet mtv a m i »».*
Ordinance confin.
nity or sorority houses j
district, to an area not n
•

.

.

•

.

]

.

.

..

*.
< i

>

is against contentic
tion against the rig.
:ses. Phi Kappa Iota F r a t e m u
v, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d .77
. *• t:

.- :es, to the extent that they
•a .-.;i .-.i::.iii spot Residential "C" or Resi
"•mi "B3" districts, did not violate require
1
i.r-t of comprehensive zoning plan. Provisions
creating very small areas for limited business
Purposes detached from "C" or "B3" districts
*. -e not objectionable as "spot zoning," or as
'iilending against the rule that zoning must be
by districts. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105
1
>ah H ! M I P ?d 704, 149 A I ,.R. 282 (1943).
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if
;

had other than the 6200 South entrance on their property.

1
2

Q

As a result of this inquiry, did you learn of any

rights that 7-Eleven asserted?

3
4

A

None.

5

0

Mr; Potter, is this corner—what were you going to

do with this property, your property?

6
7

A

Develop a shopping center on 5.9200 acres.

8

Q

Is that shopping center under construction?

9

A

Yes.

°

A portion of it?

11 j

A

Yes .

12 1

Q

Does this property which is the subject of this

10

1

, , , ...
. .• -

: I,

13 | suit affect your plans for the property—is it important to
14

the pro ject?
A

15

Very definitely.
MR. DART:

16

I will object on the basis of rele-

17

vancy of what the plans of this buyer is going to be as to

18

that property.

19
20

THE COURT:
Q

Probably isn't important.

(By Mr. Felton)

Mr. Potter, do

you

know

of the

21

approximate dimension of this parcel of property that

22

7-Eleven is using?

23
24
25

A

Approximately 87 and some fraction times a hundred

and twenty-nine foot depth off of 62nd South.
Q

Do you have the value as to the rental value?
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at

t. h

1i

THE COURT:

If he owns the property;, I think he is

2

permitted to testify.

3

sufficient foundation.

4

I think that is what it is.

5

Q

The fact that he owns it would be
I have never understood the rule but

(By Mr. Felton)

Has 7-Eleven been utilizing that

property since you purchased it in June of '84?
7

A

Yes.

8

Q

And have you on occasion seen the property?

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Okay, you have seen what k i n d — w h a t kind of use

11

is going on?

• •; ,

• : •

.••-••

12

A

A combination of used car lot sales. ,

v

-

13

Q

What do you mean?

14

A

Well, there have consistently been parked the time

15

I have seen it numerous cars parked on the strip with for

16

sale signs on them and as of yesterday when I.came by there

17

were either five or six parked on there with for sale signs

18

on it, so they have been using it.

19

Q

Are there any parking stalls on the property?

20

A

There's been some c h a l k — s o m e lines painted for

21
22

parking, yes.
Q

At any time has 7-Eleven or Southland Corporation

23

or any other person had your permission to utilize that

24

property?

25

A

No.
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. FELTON:

3

THE COURT:

4

Sometimes it does.
I will submit it.
Depends on who is asking the question.

I will hear it.

5

Q

(By Mr. Felton)

What did she tell you?

6

A

We had a couple conversations prior to the closing

7

that related to the 7-Eleven issue and one conversation was

8

she had contacted somebody from the 7-Eleven Corporation,

9

Southland Corporation and they were going to see if they did

10

have any records or anything that would pertain to any rights)

11

that they may have over that property, and in getting back

12

to her, in a subsequent conversation, she said that they

13

could not find any record of any entitlement of that prop-

14

erty to them.

15

Q

16

property? •

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

You closed it for him?

19

A

I closed it with Bob Bowles.

20

As a result, I take it your father bought the

attorney.

21

Q

You had power of attorney?

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

For your father?

24

A

Yes.

25

I was the power of

MR. FELTON:

No further questions.
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1

intends to do with the property seven years afterrthe;pur- -

2

chase by Southland Corporation.

3

done after the fact by Mr. Gini that shows the location of

4

the Southland store, the size of the lot and in conjunction,

5

I don't have any objection to that, anything that brings into)

6

play as this exhibit does with all the architects 1 or plan-

7

ners' renditions on it.

8

that t h a t —

9 1

MR. FELTON:

We have a drawing that was

It is inappropriate.

I would ask

At this point, Your Honor, we would

10

only ask to allow Mr. Pack to refer to it for purposes of

11

showing where the property is.

12

introduction.

13
14
15

THE COURT:
Q

We would not request its

I will permit its use . for that purpose.

(By Mr. Felton)

You then sometime,later bought

another 20 feet from them; is that right?
.» , \

A

Yes. .

17

Q

It is on this side of the property?

18

A

On the south side.

19

Q

That's here?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

And the property in dispute sits where I am point-

22

ing, does it not?

:..••:.••..

..

16

> .\ . » . . . t .. *

(Indicating)
., .

,

'

« •

. •; .

i v :

-..•$.,
...:'

i .•.<_. .

*.

23

A

Y e s .

24

Q

Did you ever pay them any additional sums for any

25

of this property?

,;. ;

;

..

••;.-..

,..
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Q

To your knowledge did they ever pay or did you

ever convey an easement to them across that property?
A

No. .

Q

When you are talking about accesses in the scheme

of things, are you--you are not necessarily talking about
this access right in front of their store to the shopping
center?
A

When you are developing shopping centers you draw

in there only the final approved plans exactly where the approaches are.

But in the schematic drawings you just pencil

in where you feel they ought to be.
0

. '

*

•' .

Was it ever your intention to give 7-Eleven an

access right in front of their store—
MR. DART:
be.

.-...u ,

:

Objection to what their intention may

.

•

THE WITNESS:
MR. DART:

-..

•

'

'•

•

No.

I ask that the answer be stricken.

I

object to what his intention is-THE COURT:

The objection is overruled.

The

answer is in.
MR. FELTON:

No further questions.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DART:
Q

Mr. Bowles, when you talked in your board meetings

about the possibility of putting a gas station on that
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CITY COUNCIL HELD AT THE CITY OFFICES ON DECEMBER

9% 1975

The meeting commenced at 8i05 p.m
Members present/

Mayor Junius H. Burton. Lawrence Hunt/
Grandale Finlayson John Price and Glen
Moosman

Others present:

Glenden H. Leak, A, Mecham Paul H; Gini,
Vicky Miller, Sally Wood, Jack A, Blank,
C. Brian Morrison' Robert I. Bowles. Nick
Colessides and Murial Andersen

The opening prayer was offered by"Glen Moosman.
The minutes of the meeting of November 25, 1975, were reviewed
by the Council and approved as recorded.
Jack Blank requested permission to have an office in his
| home at 7174 South 2180 West for C & B Cleaning Co. This
jwill be an office location only and there will be no machinery
I or equipment kept at the home. Mr. Hunt.stated that Planning
I and Zoning had recommended that this Conditional Use Permit
J be granted. Mr. Hunt said that if the Council approves this
j it will be on the condition that if any valid complaints are
ireceived the business will have to be discontinued. Mr._
j Hunt moved that the Conditional Use Permit be granted on the
I above mentioned condition. Mr. Price seconded the motion and
it carried unanimously,
]Mayor Burton read a notice of public hearing to rezone
;property located at 6200 South 3655 West-from RIO to CN
for the purpose of developing a shopping center. The public
hearing was opened for discussion. Mr. Gini showed on a map
jwhere the shopping center would be located in conjunction with
'the Dixie Valley Subdivision. He said that they planned to have
a mini-mall type development with grocery, laundromat, drug store
professional offices, etc, Mr. Hunt said that Planning and Zonin
had recommended that this zone change be granted but that there
should be no entrance to the shopping center from 6 200 South.
Mr. Gini said that their plans had been changed to move this
•entrance. He also stated that final development plans would begi
!
immediately if the zoning is granted. Bob Bowles said that the
shopping center would be developed professionally and would not
be just gobbed up. Mr. Hunt mentioned that all construction plan!
would have to be approved by the Planning and Zoning Commission.
All notices of the public hearing were determined to be in order.
Mr. Finlayson moved that the Council rezbne the following*descirib<
property from RIO to CN on the recommendation of Planning and
^Zoning, Mr. Price seconded the motion and it carried unanimously
Property zoned CN
Beginning at a point which is S0°00,55" E 33.00 ft.
from the North Quarter Corner of Section 20. T2S
R1W, SLB & M. and running thence S0°00,55M E 840.28
ft. to the North line of Dixie Valley No. 9; thence
S89°59,05n W331.1 ft; thence N0°01,50M W 840.28 ftDigitized by the
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